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 ABSTRACT 
 
Fitna, is a 2008 short film made by a Dutch member of parliament to support his fight against Islam. 
It shows shocking footage of terrorism, violence and women’s oppression and claims that these are 
inherent to Islam. The film caused immense controversy and mobilized people across the world to 
produce and upload their own views to YouTube. In this article we analyze these videos using 
different theoretical models of democratic interaction, and distinguishing between antagonism, 
‘agonism’ and dialogue. On the basis of a cybermetric network analysis we find that the videos are 
mostly isolated reactions on the film. Only 13 % or fewer of the posters interacted with each other 
through comments, subscriptions or ‘friendship’. These interactions could be qualified as 
antagonistic or agonistic, but very rarely involved dialogue. We therefore conclude that YouTube 
enabled a multiplication of views rather than an exchange or dialogue between them. 
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 Introductioni  
Products of visual culture have been highly controversial in the ever expanding debate about Islam .  
A particularly provocative case occurred early in 2008 when Dutch MP Geert Wilders announced he 
would make a short movie called Fitna to exhibit the dangers of Islam as he defined them. The video 
showed shocking footage of terrorism, violence and women’s oppression, and claimed that these are 
inherent to Islam. Death threats, diplomatic questions, international riots and a fierce public debate 
followed, even before the film was made. The Pakistani and Indonesian governments issued 
warnings that websites showing Fitna would be blocked in their countries. In the end, it was a British 
video sharing site, Liveleak, that first allowed Fitna to be uploaded on March 27 2008, attracting 
three million visitors in three hours.ii  Liveleak received so many threats that they withdrew the video 
the next day, but by then, Fitna had been uploaded by numerous other people and its online 
presence had become irreversible. In the ensuing weeks and months, people from many different 
countries uploaded their video reactions to YouTube, mostly in protest against the film and its maker, 
or in support of Islam.  The controversy grew as the Dutch MP attempted to show his film in several 
international seats of government. He succeeded in Washington, Rome and Copenhagen, but was 
refused entry to the UK because his visit was thought to constitute a threat to public order. The 
international media covered his hold-up at the border extensively, and when he returned to the UK 
in the autumn of 2009, Wilders again had a queue of journalists and protestors in his wake. Another 
diplomatic conflict emerged by the end of 2009, when the Turkish government said it would not 
receive a Dutch parliamentary delegation if Wilders was part of it. Meanwhile, Wilders continues to 
stir the controversy with his widely announced plans for Fitna 2, a ´spectacular´ sequel, which he says 
‘will show the consequences of mass migration from Muslim countries, freedom of expression and 
the Sharia or Muslim law’.iii  
What makes the Fitna case more than just another instance of the Islam debate, is that it is 
strongly articulated with Web 2.0 practices. MPs making their political case in visual language is a 
relatively new phenomenon, but Web 2.0, and video sharing sites like YouTube in particular, made a 
host of user-generated video reactions possible. This resulted in an even greater novelty: a global 
public debate conducted through visual media. This visual debate is the topic of this article. In a 
previous study of these video reactions, we established that their makers perform a political and/or 
religious self through their videos and assume a global audience to whom they want to speak.  Most 
videos express a desire to make a connection to geographically dispersed others in what we called a 
possible act of (global) citizenship (Van Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj, 2010). Yet, we also concluded that for 
such an act to become meaningful, it needed to be seen, listened to and acted upon by others, in 
some form of re-action or interaction. Whether and how this happened, and which views were 
shared and contested forms the general question of this paper. We will first examine the notions of 
 re-action and interaction through the the theoretical frameworks of political, religious and Web 2.0 
studies. Then, we will present the combination of research methods through which we examined the 
video exchanges and networks.iv We will conclude the analysis by asking whether and how the videos 
constitute a ‘video sphere’ for different sorts of political and religious interaction. 
 
 
Antagonism, agonism and dialogue 
It should come as little surprise that the Fitna controversy was aired on the internet. This is for two 
reasons. First, from its beginning, the internet has hosted religious websites, forums, chat rooms, e-
mail lists and so on (O’Leary and Brasher, 1996). Internet users regularly list religion among their 
reasons for going online (e.g. Hoover, Schofield Clark and Rainie, 2004). In the context of Islam, 
several authors have pointed out that the internet offers possibilities to circumvent both religious 
and state authorities. Bunt (2009:2), for instance,  claims that ‘a collaborative horizontal knowledge 
economy, reliant on peer-to-peer networking, has enveloped areas of Islamic cyberspace’.  Bunt’s 
observations are mainly based on what happens online. Yet, research among young Muslims about 
their surfing behavior has pointed in the same direction: Ho, Lee and Hamid (2008) found that they 
use the internet for their own personal religious needs rather than to interact with Islamic 
institutions. The ‘online Ummah’ that is built from this peer-to-peer surfing, offers Muslims across 
space and time to discuss their own questions and understanding of Islam. For Muslim women in 
particular this has produced a unique opportunity to express their voice about, for instance, hijab 
(Akou, 2010), gender relations (Brouwer, 2009), and anti-Islam propaganda (Vis, Van Zoonen and 
Mihelj, 2011).  
The second reason for the online prominence of the Fitna-controversy, is that the internet has also 
from the outset provided a new platform for ordinary citizens to express their political ideas and 
discuss them with others. While it is still debatable whether this potential extends to all citizens or 
simply offers additional possibilities to citizens already politically active, it is clear that every new 
internet application includes political usage, from the early bulletin boards and news groups of the 
Usenet to the blogs and social network sites of the world wide web. In this area too, it has been 
claimed that the Do-It-Yourself politics emerging from the internet, and exacerbated by Web 2.0 
affordances, has facilitated a stronger interaction of voters with political representatives (Coleman, 
2009), an easier mobilization of social movement activists (Bennet and Toft, 2009) and the 
emergence of a collective political intelligence that ‘may outperform those produced by so-called 
authoritative, concentrated sources’ (Chadwick, 2009: 5). As a result, the balance of authority 
between political institutions and representatives on the one hand, and voters, activists and citizens 
on the other has changed and made the latter parties more visible and more reckoned with. As 
 Gurevitch, Coleman and Blumler (2009:173) argue, ‘this leads to an inevitable loosening of 
*government’s and other political actors’ + control over the political agenda, forcing politicians into an 
increasingly responsive mode rather than the proactive, agenda setting role they would prefer to 
adopt’. 
 
In our earlier study (Van Zoonen, Vis and Mihelj, 2010), we found indeed that the people absent from 
the mainstream media debates about Fitna (dominated by leaders and experts, both in the 
Netherlands and the UK) did partake in making and uploading protest and support videos to 
YouTube. Young Muslims, avant-garde activists and engaged citizens expressed their views through 
typical Web 2.0 methods of morphing, mixing and mashing visual images, audio tracks and written 
captions. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the videos uploaded in reaction to Fitna consisted 
of re-loads of existing news, current affairs, documentary or education material, thus replicating 
rather than complementing the existing debates. We concluded, therefore, that YouTube functions 
as a repository of videos that demonstrate both grass roots and elite voices, and both pro-and anti-
Islam positions. The questions that remained for further research were whether YouTube also hosted 
a visual debate that involved direct interaction between those posting content, and how this debate 
could be characterized. Could these interactions be typified as dialogue within the context of 
particular normative political theories? We articulate these questions about the Fitna-response 
videos as an examination of re-actions and interactions combined with a specific investigation into 
the nature of the political and religious debate that occurred around the videos. 
 
While public sphere theory – originating from Habermas’ seminal work, but developed, adjusted and 
contested ever since – is often employed to embed these kinds of questions, Papacharissi (2009) has 
argued that it probably does not offer the most helpful perspective for understanding the kinds of 
engagement occurring on the internet, whether in its 1.0 or 2.0 variety. She argues that blogging and 
vlogging are best qualified as ‘civic narcissism’ because they are mostly means of self-expression and 
‘not created with the explicit purpose of contributing to a public sphere, the commons or 
heightening civic engagement’ (p. 238). Nevertheless, Papacharissi claims that these activities have a 
democratizing effect because they reveal a plurality of voices, aimed at demonstrating disagreement 
and thereby disclosing not only diversity but also unequal power relations. Papacharissi takes her 
inspiration from Chantal Mouffe (2000) who developed the notion of ‘pluralistic agonism’ to capture 
ineradicable differences in value systems that divide individual and collective actors in today’s 
societies. ‘Envisaged from the point of view of “agonistic pluralism”’, Mouffe argues, ‘the aim of 
democratic politics is to construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an 
enemy to be destroyed, but an “adversary”, i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right 
 to defend those ideas we do not put into question’ (p. 15). Mouffe thus constructs a crucial 
distinction between antagonism (a struggle between enemies) and agonism (a struggle between 
adversaries) (p.16). In Mouffe’s terms the aim of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions and 
encourage the formation of a rational consensus, but rather to transform antagonism into agonism 
and ‘mobilize those passions into democratic designs’ (p. 16). 
 
Mouffe’s model of democratic politics, centered on the notion of agonistic pluralism, does seem to 
capture the nature of some of the internet exchanges rather well, and has clear advantages over the 
consensus-centered model of deliberative democracy. Current research about online discussion 
spaces provides evidence of both antagonistic and agonistic exchanges. Several authors have claimed 
that at best, people use the internet to deposit their views without much interest in further 
discussion. This could be interpreted as a sign of pluralistic agonism, but the use of on-line 
communication to express antagonism, through, for instance, flaming and blaming is far more 
common (e.g. Douglas, 2008). The distinction between agonism and antagonism can also be useful to 
analyse the re-actions and interactions that emerged around the Fitna-response videos, especially 
with respect to the question of how they concern ‘acts of citizenship’ that need to materialize in 
interaction with others. Another thing to note is that empirically, Mouffe’s alternative model of 
public discussion and democracy and the deliberative democracy model are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that in some cases, the democratic potential of on-line 
communication can be assessed adequately only by drawing on both models simultaneously. In a 
previous study of Fitna-response videos (Vis, Van Zoonen and Mihelj, 2011), we came across a group 
of YouTube posters who purposively aimed to engage in a dispassionate dialogue with the maker of 
Fitna and others fearing Islam, and who actively and respectfully engaged in conversations with their 
viewers. This group of posters, consisting of young Egyptian women, employed a video and 
discussion style that is easily characterised as ‘deliberative’, and that entailed the three virtues 
defined by feminist political theorist Allison Jaggar (2000) as key to deliberation: multicultural 
literacy, moral deference, and openness to reconfigure one’s emotional constitutions. These virtues 
are not unique to Jaggar’s political theory, but also emerge from writings about interfaith or 
interreligious dialogue. Michaelidis (2009:452), for example, claims similarly that ‘interfaith dialogue 
entails mutual openness to change’, which helps acknowledge the limitations of every single faith 
and facilitates the search for common responses to global challenges, without simultaneously erasing 
differences and uniqueness. While engaging in dispassionate on-line deliberation, the group of 
Egyptian YouTube posters did not intend to build an all-encompassing consensus, nor eliminate 
passions altogether. We could therefore argue that they also contributed to transforming on-line 
antagonisms into agonistic pluralism, even if their exchanges fulfilled the normative requirements of 
 public deliberation. Exactly whether, how and why on-line reactions and interactions contribute to 
rational deliberation or agonistic pluralism – or, indeed, both of these simultaneously – thus 
becomes an empirical question contingent on the situated articulation of the event, actors, motives, 
cultural and technological contexts. 
To answer these empirical questions, we first need to ascertain whether and to what extent 
the Fitna response videos actually elicited any reactions or interactions. Then we need to consider 
who participated in these reactions and interactions and how likely it was that the content and 
nature of their participation contributed to democracy and the public sphere, be it conceived in 
terms of rational deliberation or agonistic pluralism. In the case of Fitna, the technological 
opportunities afforded by Web 2.0 and especially YouTube are crucial to establishing the nature of 
the reactions and interactions. Apart from offering users the possibility to upload their videos to the 
internet, YouTube also allows for written or video comments on these videos (reaction), and has 
social network features where users can subscribe to the channels of other users, or befriend them 
(interaction). Information scientists have begun to analyze these links using the large-scale methods 
of computer assisted network analysis, and have delivered contrasting results regarding size and 
reciprocity of these networks (e.g. Biel, 2009; Paolillo, 2008; Rotman et al., 2009). Cultural and social 
research on YouTube networks have analyzed small numbers of users and single networks and 
focused on everyday exchanges between friends and families (e.g. Lange, 2007; Rotman, et al., 
2009). Both types of studies suggest that friend and family networks on YouTube can be relatively 
strong and reciprocal, clustering around specific types of content, whereas subscription networks 
(less often researched) are somewhat weak and random. There is, to date and to our knowledge, no 
research that examines the political and/or religious content that flows through YouTube networks, 
although there is an emerging body of work about using YouTube as a platform for political purposes 
(e.g. Winograd and Hais, 2008). 
 
Research questions, data and methods 
Our review of the literature makes it possible, to parcel the overall research question of whether and 
how the videos are seen, listened to and (re)acted upon by others, into a number of more specific, 
operational research questions that address re-action and interaction.  
The first set of questions relates to reactions, in particular the number of posters and videos,  
the number of videos uploaded per poster, their main tendencies in terms of form and content and 
the number of views and comments on the videos. We assume such re-actions are a prerequisite for 
further interaction.  
 The second set of questions relates to the numbers and types of interactions the videos 
provoked and that the posters engaged in.  These are circumscribed by the possibilities that YouTube 
offers (leaving comments, subscribing to channels and befriending other posters). We will establish 
the size and strengths of these networks, their purpose, and their openness to different political or 
religious voices.  
The third set of questions is concerned with the contents of the three networks, and more 
specifically how the visual and commentary flows that run through these networks can be 
characterized: as political and/or religious antagonism, agonism or dialogue, within the meanings of 
these terms developed above.  As will become clear through our analysis, the lines between these 
categories are not always clear-cut. Some exchanges seem to fall mid-way between the categories of 
agonism and antagonism, and more precise categorization would require an interview with the 
individuals involved to ascertain whether their perception of the addressee approximates that of an 
(illegitimate) enemy or a (legitimate) adversary.v The categories of agonism and dialogue are also not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Although agonism does not require a willingness to engage in 
dialogue with the opponent, such agonistic dialogues are, in principle, possible, and it will be 
interesting to see whether we can find any evidence of this in our materials. 
We searched and selected the relevant video responses to Fitna from the YouTube site, using 
a custom-made cybermetric search tool developed by Mike Thelwall (2009) of the University of 
Wolverhampton.vi  which enables the collection of Applications Program Interface (API) data that 
show which registration information the YouTube users uploaded (e.g. gender, age, nationality); how 
many videos they uploaded; and how many views and comments they received (Thelwall, no year) .  
This cybermetric search produced 776 videos uploaded by 419 posters in the months immediately 
preceding and following the release of Fitna (February, March, April and May 2008). After these 
months the number of videos that were uploaded dropped drastically. We collected and archived the 
data in February 2010, and used that material for our analysis. Any changes in the YouTube channels 
taking place after this date were not included. 
We used the same cybermetric instrument to run network analyses for comments, 
subscriptions and friendships in the peak months.  We ran descriptive statistics on these data, and 
described the size, strengths purpose and openness of the networks.  We assessed the nature of the 
interactions through a constant comparative method (Glaser, 1965) analyzing the API data, videos 
and links of the posters that were part of one of the three networks. 
 In the presentation of our results, we have anonymized the channel names. Although 
YouTube videos can be considered semi-public data, the kind of network analysis presented here 
presents combinations and relations that posters may not have wished to be easily and publicly 
available. A fully annotated version of our analyses is available on request.  
  
 
Reactions: posters, videos and comments, 1000 
Fitna was released on Liveleak.com on March 27, 2008. Many protest videos were already uploaded 
before that day, and came primarily from Dutch posters who were participating in an organized video 
protest launched by the Dutch new media lab Mediamatic:  
“Why? Well we can’t stop Wilders. He has a right to freedom of expression … We can compete 
for attention however. And we can produce disinformation. So we are going to make Movies 
called “Fitna” in which we apologize for Geert Wilders embarrassing behavior. … So if you want 
to join in; just make your own Fitna movie and put it on line. … Call it Fitna by Geert Wilders. … ..  
If we work hard enough, no one will be able to find his crap among all the noise we produce.”vii 
Over 200 videos with an average length of between 7 and 15 seconds were uploaded, of people 
saying sorry to the camera.  They were part of an online political project that took its inspiration from 
‘culture jamming’ and ‘hacktivism’, exploiting the typical internet features of information abundance 
and burying the upcoming movie under other ones with a contrasting message.  Other videos, not 
related to the Mediamatic project, also used this practice of tagging their videos with the labels Fitna 
and/or (Geert) Wilders, while not directly engaging with Fitna.  A Muslim poster from Singapore, for 
instance, recommends adding particular tags ‘so there will be direct link to other video regarding 
conversion to Islam if watching the Fitna video. Thanks’. Such videos mostly contained positive 
images and texts about Islam, others consisted of completely unrelated content (authors, 2010). 
Benevenuto (et al., 2008) have considered such tagging practices as anti-social online behavior aimed 
at self promotion and causing content pollution. Yet, the Fitna case makes it clear that such tactics 
can be employed for political and religious purposes, in this case to marginalize Fitna and 
demonstrate oppositional perspectives.   Obviously, the point of such videos is not debate, let alone 
dialogue with Wilders or his supporters (who themselves are not interested in debate or dialogue 
either).  At the same time, however, these videos do acknowledge Wilders’ right to express his 
views, and thus treat Wilders as an adversary rather than an enemy. As such, they qualify as 
agonistic rather than antagonistic.  
 The analysis of the content and form of the videos  that did address Fitna directly, 
presented a critical position most of the time. This happened either by showing an alternative 
understanding of Islam as a peaceful religion, or by criticizing Wilders and his film for his 
demagogic methods and his demonizing of Muslims. Only a minority of videos expressed support 
for Fitna, mostly in the form of re-loads of Fitna itself, in Spanish, Russian, Polish and Farsi 
translations.  The videos could be categorized as cut-and-paste uploads of material professionally 
 produced by others (for instance news items or parts of documentaries), vlogs, registration of 
speeches and sermons, and – the most typical web 2.0 genre on YouTube, the cut-and-mix 
production in which images, words and sounds from a variety of private and public sources are 
combined (see for a detailed analysis of these videos, Authors 2009).  
Many of these videos were one-off uploads, which suggests that many people sought access 
to YouTube only to support or protest, not to engage in an exchange with others. 419 posters 
uploaded 776 videos, but, as in most participatory spaces on the Internet, a limited number of 
posters were responsible for uploading many different videos. One poster, for instance, uploaded 81 
videos about Islam in our corpus all of them tagged with (Geert) Wilders. The average number of 
views for a video was about 24,000, with a minimum of 40 for the least watched (one of the Sorry-
videos of Mediamatic) and a maximum of about 3.6 million for the most watched video, a piece to 
camera by an American stand-up comedian expressing his pride in being Muslim.  In total over 10 
million viewers watched one or more of the 776 videos, with almost 250,000 comments made 
altogether.  These numbers suggest that the videos themselves certainly provoked views and 
reactions. In combination with the locations from where these videos were uploaded (half of them 
from the US, UK and the Netherlands, the other half from across the globe), we concluded in our 
earlier study that YouTube formed an important and global platform for reacting to Fitna (Authors, 
2010). However, the tagging practices and the large number of single videos also suggested that 
regardless of these activities, there was  little desire to exchange views with Wilders or to interact 
with other users. We will examine this suggestion in more detail in the final section, after we have 
discussed which networks of comments, subscriptions and friends we found. 
 
Interactions: networks of comments, subscriptions and friends 
To assess the quantity and types of interactions between posters who uploaded their video(s) 
between February and May 2008, as well as between those commenting on their videos, we used the 
cybermetric instrument mentioned earlier. Based on the forms of interaction allowed by the 
YouTube tools, we identified three types of networks: a network of those who comment on the 
videos, a network of posters that subscribe to each-other, and a network of posters that befriend 
each-other. In the case of the network of commentators, we had to limit our analysis to interactions 
among the 50 most active commentators that commented on the greatest number of videos. The 
basic data of these networks are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Basic network data 
Type of links # people linked # of networks Basic tendency in the network 
 Comments 22,736 (out of some 
250,000 comments) 
- - 
50 most active 
commenters 
 
1 Pro-Wilders and his party 
Subscriptions 55 (out of 419 posters) 8 Pro-Islam network (28 channels) 
Mediamatic network (8) 
Pro-Wilders network (5) 
Dutch fascist channels (3  
Radio Netherlands Worldwide (3) 
Friends 44 (out of 419 posters) 6 Pro-Islam friends (30) 
Anti-Islam friends () 
Wilders supporters (3) 
 
The number of interactions compared to the total activity shows that between 9 and 13 % of general 
activity had an interactive element. Thus, out of some 250,000 comments altogether, about 9 % were 
linked to each other, 13 % of the 419 posters subscribed to each other, while 10.5 % befriended each 
other. These data further underline that the great majority of activity around Fitna on YouTube 
consisted of reactions without interactions. A closer look at the networks that did emerge suggests 
that these interactions were further limited to people with similar viewpoints. In the following 
section, these networks are presented in a visual form. They are arranged heuristically by an 
algorithm so that connected nodes tend to be close together and disconnected nodes tend to be far 
apart. The purpose of this is to make the patterns in the data clearer: patterns formed by the lines 
between the nodes. The reader's attention should focus on these lines rather than the actual 
position of the nodes. 
 
The comments links in the network of the 50 most active commentators form two connected 
clusters where many exchanges take place (see Figure 1).  
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The nodes in this network represent Fitna response videos, the lines between them concern the 
comments given. Bigger nodes show that these videos got comments from more sources, the size of 
the line indicates the number of comments exchanged. On the right hand side of the network, mostly 
Dutch supporters of Wilders group together. The names of many of them make clear where they 
stand and in case of unclear names, the comments themselves make clear that, with some 
exceptions, they support Wilders and his party.  The way the Wilders supporters and their few 
opponents in this network interact with each other is aggressive and rude.  A video uploaded a day 
after Fitna was released, for instance, mixes images of Wilders with images and sound of Hitler and 
 explains: ‘a remix from the movie ‘Fitna’ showing geert’s true ideology’viii. The video was watched 
1497 times and provoked 23 reactions.  In the excerpt below an exchange  between a supporter and 
an opponent of Wilders  illustrates the hostility in the comments. 
 
Supporter:  What is the odd one out in this list? 
 Tuberculosis, typhoid or Turk?ix 
 Answer: Turk 
 Why: TB and Typhoid can be cured, but a criminal Turk cannot 
 The only cure for that is a very big Freedom Party *Wilders’ party- 
authors] 
Opponent:  What is the odd one out in this list? 
 Fascism War Peace Wilders 
 Peace 
 War is inevitable if Wilders comes to power … Wilders is simply another 
form of Hitler. 
 
The other 23 commentators on this video use similarly hostile words (‘Wilders is saving our country, 
can’t you see you cancer morons’; most of you are paedophiles still living with your parents’; ‘fuck 
the haters, nothing is gonna stop Islam’) which suggests that many if not most of these responses 
were aimed at an enemy that was not conceived as a legitimate opponent (i.e. an adversary who has 
the right to defend his or her ideas).  As such they fall in the category of antagonism.  One poster, for 
instance, responds to a video of an Imam explaining the right of Muslims to defend themselves, with 
a series of swear words roughly translated as, ‘fuck off to your own goddamn cunt desert and never 
show your hairy ugly face here again’. Many of the channels of these commentators were closed 
between the first upload of Fitna and the moment of writingx, and many of them don’t contain 
videos at all. It is most likely that these accounts were created to belligerently support Wilders in the 
video turmoil that followed the release of Fitna.   
The left hand side of the network represents the international interactions. They contain 
both more variety of viewpoints and less aggressive exchanges, although most are still very blunt. 
Thus, one woman speaks in strong terms against Islam, while another speaks for it. A third 
commentator on this side of the network promotes Christianity, and a fourth one is hard to locate 
because s/he mainly posts ironic comments.  While the diversity of the positions suggests that in 
these links some dialogues could be present, the typical comment is rude and condescending and 
indicates that most of these responses fall into the category of antagonism or at the very least 
agonism (in some cases, it is difficult to distinguish unambiguously between the two). The following 
 comment by the woman opposing Islam provides a good example of an antagonistic expression, 
since it denies the addressee the right to defend her or his standpoint: 
I laugh thatyou claim a book of myths/deceit which is fixated/obsessed with hate, sex, 
punishments, genitalia, barbarity has quality. first prove an allah before you dribble such 
IMMATURE junk.  
The comments network thus contains flows that look like shouting matches between angry people 
aiming to silence each other. As said earlier, such ‘flaming and blaming’ is hardly uncommon in 
internet discussion. Wright and Street (2007) argue that the particular design and interface of the 
discussion space can be held partly responsible for such contents. Unmoderated and anonymous 
discussion boards, like the comments section on YouTube, would be especially welcoming to the 
disinhibited, antagonistic behavior that characterizes the Fitna exchanges we found in this network. 
We would therefore expect that the other links among the Fitna-response videos, based on 
subscriptions and befriending, exhibit different forms of exchange, and are perhaps more likely to fall 
into the categories of agonism or dialogue. 
 
The subscription links reveal eight clear networks (both big and small) of 55 posters subscribing to 
one or more channels of the group of 419 posters. By far the biggest was a network of 28 posters 
from across the world, whose channels carry names that identify their pro-Islam position. They are 
represented by the square nodes in Figure 2. The second size network was exclusively Dutch and 
built around the Dutch video-activist company Mediamatic. These videos were uploaded through 
different dedicated channels that link to each other and form this network. The third network of 5 
posters was again international and united by a pro-Wilders and freedom of speech agenda.  One 
small network consisted of three channels expressing ideas of Dutch fascism, the other small 
network consisted of the international channels of Radio Netherlands Worldwide (see Figure 2).   
 
 [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The nodes in this network represent the 55 channels of the posters subscribing to other channels in 
the corpus of data. Looking more closely at the flows within the distinct networks and examining the 
constituting channels directly, different types and intensity of interactions appear.  With one 
exception, the small pro-Wilders network consists of channels that already existed before Fitna. Their 
creators made or uploaded a Fitna video as part of their wider US based neo-conservative agenda. 
One of them, however, was a channel especially launched to re-upload the original Fitna video and 
two other support videos. After its initial productivity, this channel rapidly became less active. The 
pro Wilders network is best typified as ‘weak’, since there are no strong nodes and only unilateral 
 sequential subscriptions. The posters have little else in common; they do not comment on each 
other’s videos, nor do they have them listed as favorite.  
The Mediamatic network consists of eight channels, two of which are hosted by staff 
members of MediaMatic; three others are specifically set up as channels for the Sorry videos, one 
channel contains one Sorry video, one is a channel of a friend of a staff member. One exceptional 
subscription in this network is to a clear anti-Islam channel, possibly to have the Sorry icon to show 
up as a message in the subscription list. These are primarily channels for the Sorry videos, and hardly 
constitute a network in the sense of other exchanges taking place, mutual commenting or listing 
favorite videos.  
 The only links that suggest a stronger network are the ones between the pro-Islam channels. 
This network includes clear nodes and outliers, unilateral and reciprocal relations. The most central 
node in Figure 2 represents a channel that started in August of 2007, and is connected to 11 other 
channels of the Fitna posters, both as subscriber and as subscribed. The poster is a very active 
YouTuber, subscribing to 618 channels, subscribed to by 835 channels and friends with 783 other 
YouTubers. His video ‘response to the GARBAGE movie Fitna’  is about 5 minutes long and begins 
with a note:  ‘This video is not intended to demonize Christianity. I made this video to show how easy 
it is to take a book out of context to make a religion look bad, as was done with the Qur’an.’  The 
video consists of a still image of flames against a black background, overwritten by violent quotes 
from the Bible and supplemented by minimalist music. Halfway through the video, the music and 
background changes and peaceful quotes from the Qur’an appear.  It was viewed 11,326 times and 
drew 283 comments.  This central poster subscribes to the channel of another strong node in the 
network, which is linked to 9 other channels in the network, as subscriber and subscribed. This 
second central channel started in April of 2007, and is also maintained by a very active YouTuber (526 
subscriptions, 586 subscribers). His response to the Fitna video is a reload of a testimonial from 
another YouTuber,  a young American Muslim called BonsaiSky, who speaks to camera of his 
frustration with the ‘boring propaganda’ of Fitna. The channels of other key nodes in this network 
have a similar profile: they post videos about Islam, they are well connected to other channels and 
were highly active well before the release of Fitna.  
 
The friend links form a smaller replica of the subscription network (see Figure 3), although the 
mutual relations between the nodes (channels) are by definition reciprocal. Like the subscription 
networks, the friend networks cluster around shared political or religious positions. There are six 
networks consisting of 44 people, of which three are small bilateral connections (we did not include 
the latter in Figure 3 to keep the diagram as clear as possible).  Thirty befriended channels share their 
 appreciation of Islam. Five international channels that support Wilders have a ‘friend’ link to each 
other, and three Dutch Wilders supporters are friends. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
The names in the networks show that subscription and friends networks partly overlap. Thus, in the 
anti-Islam friends’ network, two channels also subscribe to each other. In the pro-Islam friends’ 
network, relatively strong nodes of friendship emerge around the same posters as in the subscription 
network. Altogether 15 people in the pro-Islam friends’ network also subscribe to each other, making 
their links stronger. Yet, the friends’ networks also reveal distinct additional relations to the 
subscription network, and especially striking is the network around the channel of Jordanian Queen 
Raina.  The channel was launched on March 30 2008, three days after Fitna was uploaded to Liveleak. 
While the channel was announced without special reference to the film, its purpose (to counter 
stereotypes of the Arab world and engage in dialogue and respect) was an obvious antidote, and 
media across the world made the connection. xi  The video that launched her channel was a call to 
´send in your stereotypes´ so that she could counter them. Almost two million people watched that 
video, and Queen Rania´s channel is a central one in the whole YouTube community, with 27,347 
subscribers and 7,530 friends.  The Queen Rania friends in this network are similarly concerned with 
redressing stereotypes of Muslims: one poster started with videos deconstructing the anti-Islamic 
satire of the British comedian Pat Condell who uses YouTube as his stage. Another friend in the 
network makes videos to inform and educate people about Islam, and to ‘start a dialogue with the 
western world’.  A third friend re-loaded a video from Ummah-films of an American Muslim 
explaining Islam in a testimonial to camera. Unlike the subscription and friends networks in which 
Fitna was taken up directly, the queen Rania links also include non-Muslims; two of them are from 
the US and speak to their cameras in support of tolerance, respect and friendship. These links 
suggest that a portion of Fitna-related exchanges on YouTube did consist of exchanges between 
individuals that did not share the same religious identity. These were, however, extremely rare.  
 
Friends and subscribers 
The fifteen people of the total 419 posters that turned out to be friends and subscribing to each 
other form the strongest network in our data, yet it is still not a very interactive or personal one as 
the API data and the comparison of the channels and the links showed. The posters are all young 
men, some of them still in school or university. Their average age is 27 years, with the youngest being 
19, and the oldest 34. They come from nine different countries (US/Canada: 4, Europe: 6, Middle-
 East: 3, Indonesia, Jamaica). Their names and list of favorite books and films make clear that they 
identify as Muslim, albeit in different ways. One says on his profile, for instance, that music, 
television and movies ‘are Pretty Much a waste of time and bad for you, so try to avoid it 
completely’. Another one, however, lists The Mummy: ‘I love stories about ancient civilizations, even 
if they are not real, LOL’.  All channels existed before Fitna was released, with one exception from a 
UK YouTuber who launched his channel especially to upload videos that counter the Fitna argument. 
All channels are very popular, have been viewed – on average – almost 20,000 times, and are 
subscribed to by an average of 543 other YouTubers.xii   The channels’ start dates and user numbers 
suggest that (with the exception of the one special channel) the Fitna responses of this group might 
have been just a small part of an overall YouTube practice loosely articulated with the Muslim 
blogosphere.  In fact, comparing the channels, it appears that there are no links between them other 
than the subscriptions and the friendships. They do not comment on each other’s channels and they 
rarely list the videos of others in this network as favorites. They do, however, share their perspective 
on Islam and world politics. Most of them fill the ‘Who am I’ section with references to Islamic 
websites, and their reactions to the Fitna video consist mostly of videos explaining and praising Islam 
and tagging them with Wilders or Fitna, a practice we described earlier. In addition, videos that 
purport to demonstrate  that 9/11 ‘was an inside job’, are popular within this network, as are videos 
addressing the plight of the Palestinians and revealing Israeli war crimes.  Despite the double 
connections in this network (subscriptions and friends), this is still not a very strong or personal 
network, but rather a collection of sites that share views on life, religion and politics. The links 
between them do not contain substantive interactions but rather serve to multiply the pro-Islam 
message of a single site.  However, what does make this network different from other Muslim 
networks of websites or blogs, is that it is truly international instead of national as most networks are 
(e.g.Etling et al., 2009). 
 
Summary and discussion 
Our overall question was whether and how the video responses to Fitna  were seen, listened to and 
reacted upon by others. In particular, we examined reactions to the videos, interactions between the 
YouTubers that uploaded the response videos and the qualification of these interactions as dialogue, 
pluralistic agonism or antagonism.   
 
With regard to reactions, our analysis  showed that the great majority of YouTube responses to Fitna 
(some 87%), while heavily commented upon, did not evoke additional interactions  between the 
posters or between the posters and the commenters. We thus maintain our qualification of these 
videos ‘acts of citizenship’ especially directed against Wilders and in favor of Islam , and conclude 
 additionally that they come in the form of both pluralistic agonism (acknowledging the right of others 
to speak) and antagonism (trying to silence the other). With regard to interactions, we found that 
only some 13 % of the posters engaged with each other through comments, subscriptions or 
‘friendship’. The nature of these interactions varied, but the comments  often displayed hostile and 
obscene language telling other commentators or the video poster to shut up. Subscriptions and 
friendships were mainly established between like-minded others (with the biggest ones part of the 
online Ummah) and did not involve much other interaction than sharing videos. In the strong 
network, between people who are friends and subscribe to each other,  there was also little 
conversation taking place. It seems that both the strong and the weak networks could thus be better 
described as a multiplication of identities (primarily Islamic) rather than a form of (dialogic) 
interaction between them. The MediaMatic network is a case in point: it used the linking possibilities 
of YouTube to create a larger platform for the Sorry-videos rather than as a means for interaction. 
The video practices that emerged in reaction to Fitna can thus be characterized as a set of online 
demonstrations against (and to a much lesser extent in favor of)  Fitna that express both antagonistic 
and agonistic passions and views, but that are not particularly conducive to the emergence of 
dialogue or mutual understanding.  
 While these outcomes provide a further empirical refinement of our theoretical framework, 
and are in line with other findings about (the lack of) dialogic interaction on the internet, they also 
raise new issues for reflection. The first of these is whether the outcomes can be seen as a result of 
the original hostility and aggression of the Fitna video and its maker, who is notorious for his rude 
language and lack of restraint in naming and blaming. His supporters, as they expressed themselves 
in these YouTube reactions and interactions, appear to do exactly the same and more. Evidently, 
such an ‘opening’ to a debate is not particularly inviting and is likely to provoke similarly antagonistic 
responses.  The friends network clustered around Queen Raina’s video provided the only evidence in 
our material (both in terms of videos uploaded and comments left) of interactions  between people 
from diverse geographical and religious backgrounds that were friendly and respectful, and that 
could be typified as ‘dialogue’.  Further support for the suggestion that the substance and style of the 
original video is relevant to understanding the kinds of interactions that follow, comes from the 
interactions around the videos of the group of young Egyptian Muslim women discussed earlier 
(Authors 2011). Their video opens with a respectful address to ‘Mr. Wilders’ and an expression of 
hope that they will come to a better mutual understanding.  They engage in friendly discussions with 
people commenting on their video, thanking them for positive comments, explaining their motives 
and discussing different interpretations of the Qur’an verses used. In addition to adopting an open 
mode of address, both this video and that of Queen Raina were made by Muslim women. From the 
beginning of computer-mediated communication, researchers have claimed that women 
 communicate in a friendlier manner than men, and are less involved in flaming (e.g. Herring, 1994). 
Other researchers have pointed out that gender in itself is not enough to explain online styles of 
interaction, but that the theme and history of the interaction contribute as well (e.g. Baym, 2000). In 
the case of the Fitna response videos, the relevant discussion concerns the questions of whether and 
how this situated articulation of gender, Islam and the general hostility of and towards Fitna 
produced the dialogic interaction that surround the  videos of Queen Raina and the Egyptian women.  
This is not a question that can be answered in this context, but it does point to the need for further 
research into political and religious conflict, online interaction and gender, an as yet unexamined 
topic.  
 
A second matter worthy of further reflection is the benefit of combining cybermetric methods with a 
discursive, qualitative approach.  Evidently, the cheap and quick systematic collection of videos 
carrying the tags ‘Fitna’ and/or ‘Geert Wilders’, of API data and of network relations is impossible to 
match by manual methods. Therefore, cybermetric instruments are likely to become indispensable in 
further innovative and systematic social scientific research about the internet. However, the 
cybermetric provision of comprehensive and systematic data also involves risks of particular fallacies. 
Three issues in our data further clarify this point. First, as mentioned above, the cybermetric search 
produced many videos that carried the tag Wilders or Fitna but did not address the film itself. In 
some cases watching these videos and examining their channels made clear that these were obvious 
examples of the kind of  ‘hacktivism’, organized collectively by Mediamatic but taken up by individual 
YouTubers as well. Other cases promoted Islam without referring to Wilders or anti-Islam views, and 
some videos did not make sense at all, even after closer scrutiny. The cybermetric procedure put all 
these videos in the same body of material, suggesting more coherence and consistency between the 
videos than there may actually be (fallacy of coherence). Secondly, there is a possible ‘fallacy of 
meaning’ in the network analysis. Our discursive examination of the nodes and connections in the 
network made it possible to articulate them with the Fitna controversy, but in some cases an 
outcome remained inexplicable.  One node in the subscription network, for instance, carries a name 
that suggests the presence of a production company. Its number of subscriptions suggests that it is a 
well embedded company in the pro-Islam network. Yet, the channel itself looks quite unmaintained, 
and the website that is referred to for further information has been under construction for more 
than a year, making it impossible to explain why this is such a popular node.xiii  Finally, because of its 
sheer size and range of findings, a cybermetric search and analytic instrument runs the risk of 
suggesting ‘completeness’. Such completeness, however, is by definition temporal, and biased 
towards well- established and maintained websites. The intrinsic volatility of internet material, its 
disappearance and re-appearance in different forms is much greater among individual and marginal 
 posters than among institutional and collective ones. Our research demonstrated that these 
limitations can best be overcome by combining cybermetrics with additional descriptive and analytic 
methods.   
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 Figure 3. Network of friends among the Fitna video posters 
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